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Introduction
Our main goal in this chapter is to determine whether decades of work in safety science and safety management have value for resolving controversies about GM agriculture. The implicit hypothesis is that there may be some commonalities between the safety issues posed by GM agriculture and other risky technologies, and potential benefits from using the toolbox of safety science that has been developed for more than 30 years in these other technological sectors. To avoid any misunderstanding, the discussion and points raised in this chapter do not cover the totality of the issues posed by genetic engineering. Our objective is to apply the safety science toolbox to the sharp end of the industry, that is, the crop growing practices on farmland.
Historically, safety science has dealt with high-risk technological enterprises (nuclear power industry, chemical industry, aviation industry) and more recently with medical practices (Vincent & De Mol, 2000; Amalberti, Auroy, & Berwick, 2005) . Safety science has expanded over the years. It consists of research blending several disciplines, notably ergonomics, engineering, design, occupational health, sociology, or environmental studies. Issues like human and organizational failures, contributing factors to error production, implementation of risk/hazard mitigation strategies (such as risk analysis and modeling, event analysis, systematic incident reporting system, or safety culture and
In the context of GMOs, the little we know points towards a model of farmers, knowledgeable but dependent upon the companies that develop and sell the seeds. Therefore, farmers growing GM crops are more like company employees, than independent producers. In this context, the question of the management and the organizational factors involved in their daily agricultural practices should be of keen interest to safety science practitioners. This is a critical problem because the large and powerful corporations that are producing GMOs dictate the growing of GM crops, farming sites and practices, and essentially determine the fate of conventional farming and the environment.
The social science literature reflects this inclination to neglect the safety issue: it produced a vast body of studies on expertise and experts in the early days of genetic engineering, while GM crops were still a R & D issue. Some studies shed light on the intricacies of decision making within various expert committees in the beginnings of genetic engineering (Roy, 2001) . Others have focused on expert discourse and misunderstanding of public perceptions (Wynne, 2001) , while the organization of public debates and the level of public acceptance of GMOs have also been a recurrent topic for scholars (Joly et al., 2000) . Not surprisingly the interest in public perceptions of agricultural biotechnologies in Europe has been fuelled by the controversy over GMOs itself in Europe (PABE report, 2002; Gaskell et al., 1999) .
Naturally the application and applicability of the so-called "precautionary principle" has been the meatiest part of this discussion (Godard, 1997; Bourg, 2001) . The precautionary principle is a moral and political principle according to which if an action, policy or product might cause severe or irreversible harm to the public or to the environment, in the absence of scientific consensus on the uncertainties of risks involved, the burden of proof rests on those who advocate taking the action, adopting the policy, or marketing the product. In European Law, the precautionary principle has the status of a compulsory general principle, yet it is actually not as mandatory as it sounds.
Plan
In the first section of this chapter, GM crop growing is compared with more traditional industries concerned historically with safety paradigms. Is there any parallel to be drawn between GM farming and for example the nuclear industry or the chemical industry? A similar attempt had been made by Fahlbruch, Wilpert, and Vincent (2000) in their discussion of the transposition of traditional approaches to safety in the field of medicine. These authors concluded that medicine could import many safety policies and principles already in place in the nuclear industry or the aviation industry, such as event analysis, systematic reporting of near misses, comprehensive human factors training for employees of all ranks and safety culture surveys to determine the level of appropriation of safety principles by the workforce at large. In the context of GM crop growing, the implementation of safety policies of this kind could for instance prevent the contamination of conventional crops and minimize environmental impacts. Also, the design of "safety barriers" (which will be further detailed in the remainder of the chapter), a classic approach from the safety science toolbox, might help restore public trust and confidence with regard to the consumer's ability to maintain free choice. It might also be paramount in limiting liability costs in the event of contamination.
In a second section, we will present the various properties of the implicit safety model of GM crop growing. As it is clear from the various contributions in this volume, early experiments of GM crops made choices (or refrained from making choices) about safety that have strongly influenced the framing of safety issues in the context of GM crop growing.
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Finally some important principles that are at the core of safety management in high risk industries are presented and discussed in terms of their transferability to GM crop growing and its operating systems. The sections will show that technological and organizational remediation strategies have not yet been fully laid out in the context of GM crop cultivation. They could constitute part of the institutional and organizational conditions for this production to be successful, and gain widespread social acceptance.
Parallels that can be Drawn
Contested Technology
GMO engineering, and notably GM farming is a contested technology much like the nuclear industry, or the chemical industry, which have faced fierce opposition since their inception (Jaspers, 1988 (Jaspers, & 1990 Touraine et al., 1980) . Despite the fact that some countries (France and Japan) are nowadays using civil nuclear power with little opposition, the possibility of a severe incident would be damaging to the entire industry even in countries where public acceptance is comparatively high.
Chernobyl has not been the "big one" (meaning an accident with the potential to kill the whole industry or technology at stake) that experts had predicted for the industry, but it surely eroded public confidence in the industry worldwide, as is attested to by numerous polls and surveys (See for example the French Institut pour la Radioprotection et la Sûreté Nucléaire yearly "Barometer of public opinion perception of risks and safety measures," report, July 2007)
In many respects, the management of GM farming activities is facing the same kind of challenge. Similar to the nuclear experience, there are parts of the world, where anti-GMO activists have destroyed GM experimental fields (French activist José Bové has earned worldwide fame for his actions), whereas in other parts of the world there is well established legitimacy for such crops (for instance Canada and the United States).
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The "nuclear-free zones" of the seventies mirror the "GMO-free zones" discussed in Europe and notably in Switzerland and in Russia, where areas like the Volgograd, Kostroma, Murmansk, Ryazan, Sverdlovsk, or Ulyanovsk may possibly become "GM-free zones" (Sobolevskya, 2007) .
As shown in the case of Brazil developed by Farias and Allain in this volume (Chapter 5), the GMO issue may even evolve over a 10-year period from being highly controversial to innocuous, at least officially, for the benefit of a growing industry, operating under the "fight against hunger" banner. 2 According to Farias and Allain, this rapid conversion is to be interpreted in the larger context of the influence of globalization on developing countries.
As noted by Ansell and Vogel (2006) and reinforced in this volume by Vergragt and Szejnwald Brown, public controversy over GMOs has not been limited to the toxicity issue. It quickly expanded and touched upon issues such as the perceived power of strong corporations over farmers, the consequences of trade liberalization, globalization effects, the conservation of species and plants, and consumers' free choice (Bray, 2003) .
As other examples of high-risk/high-hazards industries have shown (nuclear industry for example), a highly political profile implies an increase of the degree of public scrutiny and oversight. The latter in turn impact greatly on the daily operations of such an industry, in our case the management of GM crop growing. Although it may not be the case at the moment, in time it will surely become a growing concern for the management of GM agribusiness. As explained years ago by La Porte, the potentially highly publicized nature of any event or mishap is a burden, which in itself constitutes a risk for any organization (La Porte, 1996) . Clearly, for such high-profile industries, tremendous efforts and substantial resources are geared to either building or restoring public trust and confidence (La Porte & Metlay, 1996 , La Porte, 2001 ). This is with no doubt the case of the GM industry.
2 Recently, a similar development affects civil nuclear power, operating now under the "fight against global warning" banner. After decades of suspicion, there is undoubtedly a nuclear revival worldwide including the United States. 
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Some experts go so far as to claim that the means devoted to these activities are in fact counterproductive: they are diverting precious resources that could actually be more fruitful to the organization, including invested in safety devices. The efforts to appear transparent and open to criticism is seen as pumping a lot of energy, at the expense of vigilant but sober safety management (Perrow, 1999: 366-368; Nichols & Wildavsky, 1987) . From a different angle, Heimann (2005) is also weighing in on this issue. He suggests that the efforts a company puts into restoring safety after a big accident lead to an almost "fatal" drift towards type II risk -a waste of resources -which will "naturally" lead to safety short cuts to be able to deliver on time as expected. Heimann describes this vicious circle as the biggest obstacle to sustained investments in safety.
Among industrial actors there is certainly a tendency to limit detailed regulation, and reluctance to address growing public anxiety. In Baram's description of the U.S. case, clearly a relaxed regulatory regime is more popular than any other. Yet, as Vergragt and Szejnwald-Brown suggest in their chapter, the growing practice of voluntary sustainability reporting by companies can serve to enhance a positive stance towards transparency by including as many stakeholders as possible. The example of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) could serve as a three-point framework to support the development of safety initiatives. Under the first part "Social Performance Indicators," human factors training could be offered to foster workplace safety and product safety. Under the section "Economic Performance Indicators," economic impact on non GM crops growers could be addressed. And a third section called "Environmental Indicators," could be an adequate umbrella for workers safety and quality practices, waste management and prevention of environmental risk. There are options worth investigating. To a certain extent, the mutagenic potential that GM crops pose for the human body and the environment are similar to the potential of low radiation. These are hazards where the timeline question is particularly complex to evaluate, as the long-term effects might not be measurable, nor visible for years or decades. In the case of GM plants, it might even been trickier: genetic mutation induced by radioactive exposure is much more documented than the potential genetic disorders induced by long-term ingestion of GMOs, or dissemination and cross-pollination of GMOs (creating super-bugs and super-plants).
Uncertainty of the Hazards
In this respect, GM crop growing could be considered as a highhazards industry, because it is bound to adopt very strict and tight regulation to prevent, or deal with any unwanted consequences that at the moment are not totally envisioned, nor proven (Marvier et al., 2007) . In addition, failure during operations is not yet well characterized. As things stand, storage mingling between GM and non-GM products seems to qualify as failure, but such events do not prompt the same worry as a chemical spillover for example. As Armin Spök suggests in his chapter (Chapter 7), it might be different for the third generation of GMOs, the plant-made pharmaceuticals, GM crop-produced vaccines, and other pharmaceutical products. GM drug-producing crops could contaminate GM and non-GM food crops and derivative food products, as in the Prodigene incident and ultimately impact food consumers. For these 3 As a recall, 7 types of risk apply to GMOs, summarized by Pretty (2001) : "1) Horizontal gene flows; 2) New forms of resistance and pest problems; 3) Recombination to produce new pathogens; 4) Direct and indirect effects of novel toxins; 5) Loss of biodiversity from changes to farm practices; 6) Allergenic and immune system reactions; 7) Antibiotic resistance marker genes." P1: KpB 
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special products, the dissemination issue should be approached with extra care.
Other parallels can be drawn: for instance the effects of low radiation near nuclear power plants is one of those issues, as well as the slow poisoning and health effects on human beings (especially on the fertility rate) due to the heavy use of pesticides over the long run. One needs to mention of course that in these two cases, experts disagree (which does not mean that they deny the problems, but that they do not agree on the magnitude of the consequences). Similarly experts disagree on the two main issues regarding full-scale production of GM crops: the dissemination issue and the toxicity issue (we will return to this point in the second section).
Moreover, as in more traditional high-risk industries, suspicion is so high in parts of the world that as La Porte predicted years ago those industries will in fact be subject to "never ending management." La Porte applied the term to the operations of nuclear waste facilities, where tons of toxic radioactive waste has to be stored long-term, regardless of possible policy changes over time. Society has to be robust enough to actually ensure that such products will always be monitored in terms of commitments that former generations made for future ones. Undoubtedly
GMOs have the potential to require the same treatment, institutional care, and constancy (La Porte & Keller, 1996) .
Complexity, Tight Coupling, and Failure
If we take the "classic" definition of a high-hazard and complex system, three characteristics emerge: high potential consequences, tight functional coupling and potentially rapid evolution of untoward events. On these terms, by and large the production of GM crops appears to fit with this definition. In addition, according to Perrow's theory (1984 Perrow's theory ( , 1999 , the more complexity and tight coupling there is in a system, the more safety is in danger. In fact, it is extremely interesting to benchmark GM production 
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processes against Perrow's classic distinction between loosely coupled systems and tightly coupled systems. GM crop growing seems to qualify for a rather tightly coupled system in the causal sense. For example, once the seeds are in the fields, there is no turning back, no exit route: burning the crops is possible, but only if the eventual safety problem has been detected in due time, that is, before the harvest. But these processes are also loosely or semi coupled in the social sense. GM crop growing itself is quite loosely coupled. Fields are spread all over the world. Yet, because the GMO market is in the hands of just a few corporations, one could argue that there is an element of centralization. Hence, the term semicoupled seems preferable.
Perrow's classic idea that buffers and redundancies fortuitously available are a major requirement for safer design is of special interest for our discussion. In the case of GM crops, these buffers could probably never be fortuitous. One cannot yet picture a future where some plants will naturally and spontaneously grow to encapsulate GM plants, and become a sort of a plant-made cocoon to protect genetically modified organisms from dissemination. The whole question actually is how to put these buffers in place rigorously with respect to two stringent requirements.
The first one is economic. Buffer zones between GM crops and non-GM crops have to be kept minimal, to maximize land use and minimize GM farmers' sunk costs. In addition, because in Europe GM farmers are responsible for applying and bearing the cost of co-existence measures such as buffers, the smaller the fallow field the better, for GM farmers to make enough money. The evaluation provided by Menrad, Hirzinger, and Reitmeier in this volume (Chapter 6) gives a rather undecided picture on this issue. According to their study two variables are of great importance : (1) the size of neighboring non-GM seed production plots;
(2) the level of threshold for GM presence in non-GM seeds. Small variations of these factors impact the results quite substantially. Interestingly, Menrad and colleagues stress the fact that the cost of specific stewardship or training programs designed for farmers and aimed at helping them to 
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implement the suggested co-existence measures in agronomic practices is not included in available studies.
The second requirement deals with safety and has to do with the prevention of any adventitious presence of GM seeds in conventional seeds. When plant-made pharmaceuticals reach their full deployment, this requirement will be critical. In this case, buffer zones have to be large and the distance between crops as big as possible. These precautions might not be enough, and other strategies detailed further below are under discussion. As we can see, such dilemma is at the core of any concrete discussion of GMOs future in Europe for example, where the co-existence requirement is applied (Beckmann, Soregaroli, & Wesseler, 2006; Coléno, Angevin, & Lécroart, 2009) .
Following further upon Perrow's framing of the complexity issue, it is certainly true that there are "hidden complex interactions" in GM crop growing, notably those posed by the environmental impact of such crops.
Some of these interactions are not yet foreseeable, because data collection is too limited so far. Some scientists are dissatisfied with the data currently at their disposal. 4 It will take decades to properly compare data and draw conclusions on potential negative effects of GMOs on wildlife, or biodiversity.
Last, one could argue that the relative diversity of the stakeholders increases the risk that safety might not be dealt with at the required level of stewardship. The GMO industry is a rather complex network of stakeholders. First, we encounter the biotech firms (Mosanto, Bayer, Syngenta, DuPont, Dow, and so on), the operators (managers, technicians, and farmers) of large, industrial-scale agribusiness, those growing 4 As Marvier et al. (2007 Marvier et al. ( :1465 put it: "Public debate regarding risks and benefits of genetically modified crops continues unabated. One reason for the unrelenting controversy is that disagreement about new technologies often has little to do with scientific uncertainty but instead arises from differing personal values and differing levels of trust in public institutions. However, in the case of GM crops, scientific analyses have also been deficient. In particular, many experiments used to test the environmental safety of GM crops were poorly replicated, were of short duration, and/or assessed only a few of the possible response." P1: KpB GMOs and those who do not choose to grow GMOs, and expect to be protected from any dissemination incident in their fields. Secondly, consumers: Those who do not bother, and those who bother actively, more precisely anti and Pro-GMO activists; We find also independent labs, scientific experts from different disciplines (biology, toxicology, environmental sciences, agricultural economics . . . ) along with regulators -at national, federal in the case of the US or supranational level in the case of the EU -, and last politicians, to only name the most important ones.
All these stakeholders bring different perspectives to the question of GM farming safety. Stewardship probably would require a minimal institutional centralization. This point will later be addressed in the context of potential benefits for the GM industry from transposing existing safety managing devices. One such benefit could be the implementation of events reporting systems, thus prompting collective action in support of some kind of centralized monitoring system.
Unfolding the GM Crop Growing Safety Model: The Legacy of Early Choices
In this section, we will turn to the implicit GM crop growing safety model as grasped through the various contributions in this book. This exercise in itself entails notable difficulties. In fact, "safety" is a bit of a misnomer here, as for most experts there are no safety issues in the classic sense, regarding GM products. Yet, some of the claims that GM crops pose environmental risks and also threaten non-GM crops are increasingly supported by new scientific evidence (for example, gene flows are occurring). This situation requires the adoption of constraints on the sitting of GM crops and the implementation of and adherence to special practices for their farming, storing and distribution to minimize risks and simultaneously minimize "contamination" costs for the GM and non-GM industry. Despite some resistance to tackling these issues under the "safety" umbrella, two distinct problems could be of interest for a safety 
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approach. First, the toxicity issue: will eating GM products affect our health, modify how certain organs function, now or in the future? Toxicity measures and tests are provided to assess this matter. Secondly, the dissemination issue: will growing GM crops affect the environment so much as to provoke substantial ecological changes in living species, in other categories of plants? Ecological assessment is currently being developed but more time is needed to be able to draw conclusions. Furthermore, will it reduce biodiversity?
The toxicity issue has been dealt with from the outset, in the early eighties and outcrossing, at the very end of the pre-market tests in the mid-1990s. This recent history gives us insights on choices made at the time that precluded the adoption of broader safety practices, aimed at mitigating environmental risk for example.
The Implications of a Product Safety Model Versus a Process Safety Model
At the beginning, the kind of safety assessment performed by the various institutions in charge of the food safety standards, when authorizing GM products on the market, mainly focused on the intrinsic qualities of the product. This has been (and still is) especially the case for the American philosophy towards GMOs and less so for the struggling EU philosophy, embodied by the European Food Safety Authority.
In retrospect there has been much consideration of the qualities and performance of products per se, and less so of their possible interactions in the field with other plants and species or deterioration at storage sites. Consequently, safety has mainly been dealt with in two ways: First, through the assessment of each novel GM trait. For example, the safety of a particular protein regarding toxicity is assessed using animal feeding tests; secondly, through the assessment of the unforeseen changes in plant metabolism as a result of gene transfer. Therefore, at first safety issues involved in growing, storing or exporting the GM plants were not seen as part of the scope. They were left out.
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At present, in the United States there is no obligation for farmers and growers to organize post market environmental monitoring. Limited attention is paid to the exact conditions under which such plants are cultivated, stored, exported and handled. From the beginning a deliberate choice was made to treat them as any other food product (See Chapter 2). In addition, the various incidents that have been reported, concerning dissemination, cross-pollination, or commingling errors between storage facilities, have not been directly life threatening for human beings. For many experts, these events are not classified as "safety-related" problems but more as "quality-related" issues.
Nonetheless, these events received a lot of public scrutiny, especially because they exposed to the world the hidden face of the whole process: that is, the daily operations at the production sites. Human and organizational factors are suddenly in the loop, seeking a place at the table. As Armin Spök warns us in his eye-opening chapter (Chapter 7), these human and organizational issues will not be ignored for long, as they constitute challenges for further development of plant-made pharmaceuticals. These crops should not occur accidentally in the food and feed chain because unlike first generation GM crops, plant-made pharmaceuticals are purposely designed to have a biological effect on man or animal health and well-being. This neglect for environmental issues is less true in EU recommendations and philosophy, although interest in the subject is somewhat moderate. 
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the point: "PMEM is composed of case-specific monitoring and general surveillance of GM plants. Case-specific monitoring is not obligatory 6 but may be required to verify the environmental risk assessment, whereas a general surveillance plan must be part of the application," continuing with "The GMO panel concludes that general surveillance can not be hypothesis-driven, but should when possible, 7 make use of existing monitoring systems in addition to more focused monitoring systems (i.e. farm questionnaires)." The wording limits the impact of the first sentence.
One can conclude from these excerpts that that Post Market Environmental Monitoring (PMEM) is not yet standard practice among growers and farmers. Safety management has not yet come to GM production at farm sites. This original orientation, summarized above, has been further supported by the type of safety assessment, the "substantial equivalence principle" that is currently accepted as state of the art for market authorization of GM products. It certainly led to a rather restricted safety perspective on large-scale GM production.
The Implications of the "Substantial Equivalence" Principle for a Safety Approach
The "substantial equivalence" concept explained in this book by Marianne Shauzu is paramount. Essentially, for regulators to grant market authorization, the required demonstration revolves around a systematic comparison between the properties of the GMO-derived food with existing, "natural" products used as food or food sources. As stated by Marianne Shauzu: "It is based on the idea that existing products used as foods or food sources can serve as a basis for comparison when assessing the safety and nutritional value of GMO-derived food. It implies that if the modified food is found to be substantially equivalent to an existing food 
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or food component with regard to phenotypic and agronomic characteristics and chemical composition, it can be treated in the same manner with respect to safety" (p. X in this volume). Earlier in the history of GMOs, molecular biology was the core, and almost the unique science that was able to evaluate and authorize experiments throughout Europe (for example) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the time, it was argued that the safety of GM products was essentially determined by the quality of the molecular design. The better and duly described by biotech firms seeking approval for tests, the safer the design would be, according to biologists. Moreover, the conviction that the design had to be as simple and elegant as possible to be deemed safe contributed heavily to producing a type of safety assessment, based on the intrinsic qualities of the new plant itself (Roy, 2001) . At this point, safety was only considered from the angle of molecular biology. There was no attempt to broaden the context of safety issues, and include matters such as dissemination or commingling errors at storage sites. The second term of reference is then a "natural" product that does not need to be assessed because it has already been cultivated for decades (or centuries) with no history of toxicity. For many experts, a GMO is after all just another plant. For most of them at the time, a GMO was structurally safer because complete design traceability could be detailed and provided. Explicitly the dominant philosophy was that GMOs were much more under control than existing plants (which have centuries of enhancement with less rigorous techniques), hence, they were deemed much safer (Kahn, 1998) . One of the implications of such a narrow vision of safety is that it focuses mainly on the plants' characteristics, and neglects the interaction of such plants with existing ecosystems. Also it fails to address companies' responsibilities for growing them, or the type of organization of work needed to manage safely such crops.
This early choice had to be reevaluated when growing concerns emerged among experts who put this new technology's weak point on the 
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with their environment and the necessity to address current agricultural practices. So far the safety evaluation of GM products had been conducted without consideration for farmers and growers. Moreover producers claimed that it was their responsibility, their turf, to watch over such a safety issue, if any. Interestingly enough a similar claim has always been made by the nuclear industry, for instance, when asked how it goes about contracting practices during maintenance outages. Even in heavily regulated industries, some domains are beyond the reach of regulators.
The Dissemination Issue, Outcrossing, Commingling Error : The Hidden Flaw in the Safety Model of GM Production
Finally, 10 years ago the safety assessment of GMOs was forced to incorporate the dissemination issue. In Europe, the controversy over such problems emerged in the mid-1990s, when the Belgian firm, Plant
Genetic System (GPS), sought authorization by the British authority for its rapeseed, in 1994. It was only then that bio-vigilance appeared as a major part of the safety assessment of GMOs. This rather late emergence is rooted first, as we explained above, in the predominance of molecular biologists in the early stages of the evaluation process and second, in the type of experiments that had taken place up until that point. Furthermore, it seems traditional bio-molecular experts considered that agronomic practices were outside their competency, scope, and mandate. Mostly, they were used to implementing biological containment, that is "pollen proof" tunnels, and limiting interaction with other fields, as pillars of their safety protection policy. For small-scale experiments, these protection measures seemed adequate.
However, transposing these measures and techniques to large fields seemed rather unrealistic.
This narrow vision of safety, linked only to the product, with no consideration for its environment nor for the production system involved, strongly influenced the fate of GM crop growing safety management. In the early 1990s, market authorizations seemed far away for experts and their model of reference was still the lab, with its biological containment Opening the "Classic" Safety Science Toolkit
Classic Barriers
The dissemination issue raises a well-known safety problem, revolving around buffers and system barriers. The truth is that providing for an efficient strategy against wind blowing and bees is probably much more complex than containing the activities of a high-risk technology.
In other high-risk industries where the dissemination issue is critical, being directly related to radiological contamination, chemical spills, or toxic effluents, the thinking is further advanced. Along with "safety zones" or "exclusion zones," the notion of "defense-in-depth" combines several types of barriers. At first, "defense-in-depth," historically from the nuclear industry, was almost exclusively seen as technological in nature.
8 Now it is understood as a much more complex notion, 8 In the case of nuclear power plants, as a first barrier the nuclear materials are encapsulated in zirconium metallic tubes, the reactor has a stainless steel envelop, and thirdly; massive concrete walls protect the whole machine. That arrangement makes for the historical "defense in depth" of the nuclear industry. The "modern" defense-in-depth concept has profited from two sources at least: (1) The results of the human factors research on categories of errors and mishaps, which led to more effective error prevention and risk mitigation strategies (Reason, 1990; Reason, 1997; Amalberti, 2005) ; (2) The results of organizational studies attempting to better understand the social production of safety during "normal" operations (Rochlin, La Porte, & Roberts, 1987; Weick, 1987; La Porte & Consolini, 1991; Rochlin, 1998; Weick & Roberts, 1993; , Bourrier, 2002 Perin, 2005) , along with important work done on major accidents (Vaughan, 1996; Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005) , which revealed the mechanisms of what Vaughan has labeled "the normalization of deviance," or Snook, "the drift into failure" (Snook, 2000) .
Of course, the idea that barriers have to be diverse has been heavily influenced by the findings that numerous accident investigation commissions brought to light: Big accidents are rarely triggered by a unique, isolated human error, as often claimed in the past. Nor are they only caused by faulty technology. On the contrary, organizational factors play a crucial role in the fatal development of catastrophes, such as Chernobyl (Reason, 1987) , Bhopal (Shrivastava, 1987) , the two losses of the NASA shuttles (Challenger, 1986 , Columbia, 2003 , or the contaminated blood scandal in Europe in the late 1980s (Setbon, 1993) , to name only a few. For most safety experts, the organizational factors are the next frontier to be explored so as to see continuing progress in safety in high-risk industries. This hard-to-achieve progress will guarantee that the central role of these systems in the functioning of our societies, despite the risks and hazards involved, still meet with broad public support. To illustrate our point: airplanes are considered as safe as possible, safer than any other means of transportation (even if new technical improvements are always possible, probably not much progress can be obtained there), yet the current civil aviation safety problems point toward problems in air traffic management and airport infrastructure,
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which are complex organizational problems and serious contributing factors to near-misses, incidents, and accidents.
Briefly, the first barrier is physical or technological, essentially owing to the design of the technology itself. Typically, massive concrete walls, fire and explosion-proof structures, earthquake proof-structures, flooding-proof levees, or spill receptacles are technological in nature.
Administrative barriers constitute a second line of defense, through detailed procedures, that describe the exact functioning and limitations of each safety agency. They also provide preventive maintenance and routine surveillance to limit exposure to potential problems and to check potential degradation of passive barriers. Organizational barriers are a third defense. They describe the exact responsibilities of each category of employee and a description of key processes along with a predetermined division of labor covering various situations for all stages, from the routine production mode to the emergency mode. Formal communication flows and standardized language are also provided, as well as the emphasis on formal and informal debriefing and opportunities to exchange freely on surprises and unwanted events. Finally, adequate training, personnel selection and specific licensing can be considered individual barriers. In addition, these industries have put in place access limitations and diverse devices (alarms, red flags, and signature check-points on procedures) to avoid breaches in the defenses or to warn employees about possible breaches. The key point is to provide the first-line actors with an updated view of the state of the system at all times.
It is of interest to note in passing that the medical field is also interested in this line of thinking, and is struggling to put in place system barriers, capable of reducing preventable errors (Amalberti et al., 2005; Carroll & Rudolph, 2006 ). This description is not aimed at suggesting that those barriers are sufficient to guarantee operational safety. Of course they are not. The whole debate after Chernobyl led to the recognition that much more was needed to operate such complex systems and ensure reliability and
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safety (Schulman, 1993; Bourrier, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Perin, 2005) . The idea here is to envision plausible parallel efforts to tackle the dissemination issue for GM crop growing. What could be a sensible "defense-in-depth" for large-scale GM production?
Defense-in-depth for GM Crop Growing: A Snapshot?
The design of "defense-in-depth" for this kind of production should certainly not be envisioned in the same way as the more traditional "defense-in-depth" already in place in high-risk industries. Building fences against gene flows and winds is a daunting challenge. But the difficulty should not and have not discouraged the various stakeholders from finding acceptable precautions, which could contribute to building a modern hazard-mitigation strategy. Several ideas have been brought in, as this volume illustrates. They could be interpreted as an embryonic model of "defense-in-depth," whose development is more pressing in the context of Plant-Made Pharmaceuticals. Vaccines, monoclonal antibodies, therapeutic enzymes, hormones, or interferon are among the substances that could be obtained from GM plants such as maize, tobacco, soybean, or barley. Some examples of possible barriers are explored below. 14, 2010 19:3 chloroplasts, hence pollen is not a transmitter, which prevents gene flow from the genetically modified plant to other plants. So far this third option has only been proven reliable for tobacco. As an example of a so-called technological barrier, operating like a "natural" molecular confinement mechanism, there is a provision under discussion to the effect that plant-made pharmaceuticals will only be hosted by non-food/nonfeed crops (like tobacco), hence reducing the risk of contaminating the food/feed chain. These strategies relate to "safety by design" strategies.
Technological and Physical Barriers
In addition, the set up of a closed system for production (contained conditions and no chance of open pollination) using air-tight greenhouses, and covering inflorescence, qualifies as a physical barrier. Crop destruction after extraction of protein is also a physical barrier to prevent any unwanted mutation. Of course fences and "no entry" signs, as in any high-risk plant, are also considered.
A forth element, included in the first barrier type, uses agronomic techniques: co-existence measures like crop rotation, cultivation in remote areas, buffer zones, staggered planting of GMOs versus neighboring food and feed crops, or distinct visual markers exist already and could serve as an interesting addition to a more complete arsenal.
Administrative Barriers
In Chapter 7, Armin Spök gives examples of several Standard Operating Procedures currently discussed or proposed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. They are geared to plant-made pharmaceuticals, but could well apply to first generation GM crops. Relying on Spök's information, Standard Operating Procedures will be developed for seeding, transplanting, harvesting, cleaning, storing, dying, and processing of biomass. They will also control the use of machinery, and promote dedicated use of machinery to minimize contacts between GM and non-GM products. Incidentally, this list of concrete activities carried out on farm sites gives us a perspective on the broad safety aspects involved. There is no doubt that these organizational factors will come under public scrutiny in the case of a severe contamination incident, with potentially negative health effects. But so far, as in early periods of "classic" high-risk industries development, emphasis on these issues has not been a priority.
Human Barriers
In line with our comment on organizational factors, there is no information on the characteristics of the operators, handling GM production. No information on the requirements that corporations or agricultural firms have put in place for the recruitment and the specific safety and quality training of their employees. No doubt such issues could potentially become important in the case of unwanted errors and mishaps.
As Menrad, Hirzinger, and Reitmeier (Chapter 6) and also Spök (Chapter 7) observed in their respective chapters, so far the adoption of co-existence measures on one hand and the adoption of good safety and quality practices to avoid dissemination and contamination incidents on the other, are not top priorities. Even so, both should have a great impact on the social organization of crop co-existence. Moreover, it appears that co-existing measures and safety and quality practices are kept separately.
Interim Conclusion
Despite some elements that are already envisioned in the field, a systematic hazard-mitigation response combining technological, physical, organizational, and individual barriers on a par with what exists in other high-risk industries has not been fully deployed. To appreciate this situation, one has to recall that most experts do not see the dissemination issue in safety terms. The dissemination problem is rather presented as a consequence of consumers' free choice, mainly in Europe. Therefore buffers or rotation zones are not seen as a risk-mitigation measure to contain/prevent/reduce the possible adverse effects of products, as their interaction with the rest of the environment is yet to be understood.
These measures are only tolerated and promoted as a market requirement. This might explain why a comprehensive response has not yet emerged. However, this attitude might change drastically in the context of plant-made pharmaceutical development.
Conclusions: Propositions
The Standard Operations Procedures (SOPs) emerging in the context of molecular farming could also be applicable to more traditional GM cultivation. SOPs could constitute a first response to the growing public demand for more systematic quality and safety traceability. This effort could foster a keen interest in agricultural and agronomic practices and a necessary consideration of organizational and human factors that have been so far neglected throughout the process.
However, the march toward SOPs should not become an alibi and be the sole response to safety and quality alarms. As the examples of other industries have taught a vast community of experts, one can only achieve 
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part of the goals by designing procedures. There should also be a consideration of the various factors that play a role in fostering safety culture on sites and throughout the marketing process. Special attention given to organizational issues at industrial-scale agribusiness and sites and a better understanding of the sociology and economy of GM crop growing, including its institutional and political environment, are two key aspects of a possible step towards this goal. It is also one way to start building an emergency-preparedness response in case of an adverse event.
So far, the public has little knowledge of the organizational and institutional policies already put in place by this industry to recover promptly from a problematic event. Studies on the day-to-day operations at farm sites could also contribute to a new perspective on this technology, too often considered only as laboratory "magic," or a potentially harmful technology.
The other tool that could be put in place addresses the systematic reporting of unwanted and adverse events (such as contamination of non-GM crops, commingling at storage sites, and gene flows). Clearly, this kind of effort would require the industry and/or the regulators to don a stewardship role that seems lacking at the moment. The nuclear industry as well as civil aviation has now developed institutional links across countries and companies (even imperfectly) that assume this stewardship role. 9 The chemical industry is struggling to put in place a formal exchange of information, as transparent as possible. Industry patents and trade secrets are serious obstacles to such initiatives. The same sort of obstacles is certainly at the core of the wariness one can perceive from the GM firms. However, such efforts have gradually been considered as mandatory after severe accidents struck not only 
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a single company, operating the site or plant responsible, but the industry as a whole. As if the perspective of having to suffer from bad operators prompted each of these high-risk industries to organize their own vigilance (Rees, 1994) .
The fact that NGOs and anti-GMO activists have websites collecting data on various incidents regarding the production of GM crops (the Greenpeace contamination index for example) could also be a strong motivation for the industry to organize at a more macro level to set up its own forum of exchange and data collection, notably on unwanted and adverse events. The growing practice of voluntary sustainability reporting by companies, described in this volume by Vergragt and Brown (Chapter 8) could be an adequate vector for such cultural change.
Finally, comparing the situation of GM crop growing with "classic" high-risk industries on one hand and the medical field on the other hand according to the various dimensions discussed in the chapter, sheds light on the merits of such a comparison (see Table 1 ).
To sum up, compared to classic high-risk industries and hospitals, there is scant maturity regarding the human and organizational factors issues involved in the safe and reliable management of GM agricultural sites. Interestingly, the medical field, where failure is accepted (less and less so) and death always possible, as opposed to the production of GM crops, where failure would not be tolerated, is far more advanced in taking into account the crucial contribution of team work, communication, and organizational dimensions in the delivery of safe care, than the GM industry. Hence, there is much room for improvement in the management of hazards and risks at agricultural production sites. It could certainly benefit from programs developed for other high-hazards industries. For one thing, political pressure and public opinion will probably force corporations to initiate some actions in this direction. But, more importantly, the requirements in term of quality and safety of the end-products (GM, as well as non-GM), and those of the plant-made pharmaceuticals will probably compel companies to attend to these issues, because they are 14, 2010 19:3 at the core of any safe production. Probably equally important for safe GM production are the intrinsic biological traits of the GM product and the social conditions in its production. 
